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The Question of Truth in Literature




This chapter starts with the question of truth in literature, noting that this 
question has several interrelated senses: can literature present (significant) 
truths at all?; what does its presentation of truths (if it exists) have to do with its 
manner of presentation (with literary language)?; and is the presentation of truth 
a central aim of literary art? The chapter surveys a variety of neo-Fregean 
(Lamarque and Olsen, Walton) views that reject the very possibility of literary 
truth as well as a variety of anti-Fregean views (Goodman, Heidegger) that 
endorse it. But those endorsements often do not say enough about literary 
language and its grip on specific actualities. To move beyond this dispute, the 
chapter argues that Hegel, in his remarks on literary imagination in his Lectures 
on Fine Art, shows illuminatingly how literary writers sometimes arrive (and 
centrally aspire to arrive) at a distinctively poetic grasp of the world: die 
poetische Auffassung der Welt.
Keywords:   literary truth, Lamarque and Olsen, Walton, Goodman, Heidegger, Hegel, poetic vision
1.
As Hegel remarks near the beginning of his discussion of literary art, “To define 
the poetic as such or to give a description of what is poetic horrifies nearly all 
who have written about poetry,” primarily because “the most heterogeneous 
works count as poetry.”1 Hence it will help to begin by noting that the argument 
here is not intended to apply directly to all things that are reasonably called 
works of literature, but only to certain central cases of artistic literary 
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achievement. The question will then be, “What, if anything, do central cases of 
literary achievement have to do with the presentation of truth?”
There is some warrant for a focus primarily on central cases when we think of 
literature as a form of human practice that is significantly oriented, even if not 
sharply defined, by reference to its high achievements. Paying attention to what 
goes on in every case is likely to fail to illuminate both what is distinctively 
present in the central cases and what the lesser cases often (but not always) aim 
at but fail to achieve. To see this, consider baseball as a practice. When there 
are not enough players available, children sometimes play baseball with one 
field closed, or with throwing to the pitcher’s mound counting as throwing to 
first base, or with batters at the plate, without called balls or strikes, until they 
make contact and hit a ball into fair territory. Children who are just throwing a 
ball back and  (p.120) forth will often say that they are playing baseball, and it 
would be churlish to insist that they are not, simply because there are not 
eighteen players present observing all the rules of major league baseball. Even 
the official rules of major league baseball change over time. For example, new 
rules are introduced to deal with balls hitting ceilings or catwalks of indoor 
stadiums, or the powers and responsibilities of umpires to eject players are 
increased in order to reduce intentional beanings. One could try to develop an 
account of baseball that covered all cases of baseball games, from the World 
Series to children’s versions of street baseball, as well as everything in between, 
and reference to the rules of baseball, or to some version of them, will not be 
irrelevant. But such an account is likely to be less illuminating about the natures 
and interests of the various skills that are both aimed at and developed by 
players, such as agility and good hands for fielding or the abilities to hit or to 
throw a late-breaking slider, or about how the development and exercise of such 
skills figure in competitive situations. Fans of baseball know about and pay 
attention not only to the rules of baseball and not only to particular teams, such 
as the Lehigh Valley Iron Pigs, but also to how skills are developed, exercised, 
and tested in relation to competitive situations over time, particularly at the 
highest levels, but also sometimes in settings where younger players are either 
practicing for higher levels of play or simply enjoying themselves, often quite 
informally. One way, though not the only way, to get a grip on all these varieties 
of baseball practice is to pay attention to what is remarkable and memorable 
about some of the best cases of baseball achievement: to Ozzie Smith’s way of 
playing shortstop or to Mariano Rivera’s slider or to Ryan Howard’s power to 
left field.
Matters grow even more interesting when we pay attention to the achievements 
of a team at a high level, where we focus on how quite divergent sets of skills on 
the part of different players are brought into play in various ways over time and 
under changing conditions of stadium, weather, injury, age, and so on, in order 
to maximize a team’s chances of winning. An attentive fan will typically know a 
good deal about developing—that is, variously advancing, eroding, and changing 
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—skill sets and chances of winning of a number of major league teams playing at 
a high level. If knowledgeable fans are asked what they find interesting or 
engaging or important about baseball, they will probably, if they are articulate 
and in a reflective mood, mention something like this, and what they have to say 
will be illuminating in a general way about the interest of baseball and about 
achievements within it.
Something like this is true about literature as a practice. One could try to 
generate a precise extensionally adequate definition of literature. But given the 
varieties of literary practice, any such definition is likely to be wildly disjunctive, 
 (p.121) to miss some marginal but by no means unimportant or uninteresting 
cases (comparable to children’s adaptations of baseball to their local 
circumstances), and to fail to illuminate the aims of literary art.2 It would be a 
fatal objection against proceeding by considering certain central cases of 
literary achievement if one either wildly misidentified central cases, such that 
the choices just seemed arbitrary in relation to the experiences of many readers, 
or if one said wildly implausible things about them, just as if one tried to 
illuminate the development and exercise of distinctive skill sets in baseball by 
focusing on only a haphazard local sandlot game. It would be problematic if the 
characterizations of the central cases could not be related, with adjustments and 
compensations, to what is going on in a wider range of cases. But keeping these 
risks in mind, it seems reasonable to wade in to the topic of what certain literary 
writers do, when they are managing to do something centrally important within 
literary practice, and then just to go on from there.
2.
One of the most prominent and persistent ways to try to characterize what 
literary writers are doing is to compare their work with what goes on in the 
natural sciences, history, and other so-called cognitive disciplines. Literary 
works are frequently though by no means always fictional, so that the literary 
enterprise cannot be devoted primarily to offering news, backed by reasons 
drawn from experiments, calculations, archival research, and so forth, about 
mind-independent objects of experience. Even when they are not fictional, 
literary  (p.122) works invite and reward attention to their surfaces, to their 
exact ways of rendering a content, rather than only to the content rendered.3
In historical retrospect, it is easy to see why it is natural for many of us, at least 
since the seventeenth century, to talk of literary works as made for the sake of 
enjoyment or appreciation or reflection on themes rather than for the 
presentation of truth. Whereas the Homeric epics were pre-eminent among a 
small number of literary works that were performed at festivals for hundreds of 
years and that embodied and sustained the sense of a relatively isolated 
historical people about the worth of a way of life, and whereas the Bible and 
perhaps associated sermons were for a millennium among the few literary texts 
that many people would encounter, the invention of movable type, not to 
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mention all subsequent varieties of text presentation, has made available to us 
uncountable numbers of stories with many different plots. Coupled with 
increasingly complex commercial life and awareness of distinct spheres of 
culture—linguistic, geographic, trading, agricultural, and so on—our encounters 
with manifold diverse texts make it natural for us to speak of appreciation and 
enjoyment in place of the presentation of a single, more or less coherent set of 
truths about value in life.4 In contrast with the pluralization of literary works and 
literary experience, modern experimental–mathematical natural science is the 
big dog in the room, with a seeming monopoly on methodologically achieved 
consensus and truth-presentation.
Whatever is going on in the generation and reception of modern literary works, 
it may then seem that it cannot centrally be a matter of the presentation of 
truths. Something else must be said about what literature is all about. As Frege 
notoriously remarks, literary works frequently lack
the striving for truth which urges us to penetrate beyond the sense to the 
nominatum. … [I]n listening to an epic, for example, we are fascinated by 
the euphony of the language and also by the sense of the sentences and by 
the images and emotions evoked.5
 (p.123) Depending, however, on what one makes of what is going on when one 
is “fascinated by the euphony of the language and also by the sense of the 
sentences and by the images and emotions evoked”—and Frege offers no further 
characterization of what is going on—this characterization of our interest in 
literary achievement is prima facie inadequate. Talk of euphony directs our 
attention only to the surface of the literary work, as it were, without any 
reference to its presentational or representational power; and fascination by 
sense and by images and emotions evoked suggests an at least unclarified 
“inner” process. One wants to ask at least: what is the character and what is the 
interest of such fascination? And: can we describe it more fully, in terms that will 
make manifest not only the persistence, but also the reasonableness of our 
engagement with literature, rather than casting it as a psychological quirk that 
is more or less trivial in comparison with the serious businesses of the sciences?
In a Fregean vein, but with considerably more sophistication about and insight 
into literary experience, Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen have argued 
against the idea that literary works present truths about mind-independent 
objects of experience and for the idea that the appropriate experience of a work 
of literature is centrally a matter of the appreciation of its artistic value. 
Negatively, they argue that we often appreciate and value works of literature 
even when they fail to show us “what it is like” for a character to be in a 
situation and fail to enrich or to modify our possessions of concepts.6 Hence 
literary achievement cannot be a function only either of the presentation of 
truths about subjective experience or of conceptual enrichment. Positively, they 
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develop a conception of literary achievement as “its own form of insight, its own 
kind of interpretation of thematic concepts,”7 where the forwarding of insight 
and interpretation are best thought of as forms of the cultivation of 
understanding rather than of the acquisition of new knowledge. As Lamarque 
has more recently put it, literary art
is valued for the seriousness with which it treats themes of universal 
interest, like life and death or love and duty, and these themes handled 
well invite serious reflection; but the idea that attention to such themes 
issues in practical or instrumental usefulness, making better or wiser or 
more morally sensitive people out of those exposed to art, as opposed to 
those with no such exposure, is not empirically well founded.8
 (p.124) The accounts of the value of literary experience that Lamarque and 
Olsen put forward are attractive and serious, and they offer us a richer 
vocabulary of appreciation, of reflection on themes, and of the cultivation of 
understanding for describing that experience than anything that is on view in 
Frege. And yet the difficulty that troubles their stance is not far from what 
troubles Frege’s. Just what is going on when we acquire new understanding of a 
phenomenon via serious reflection on the themes of a literary work? The term 
understanding suggests a cognitive achievement, not just the psychological 
quirk of fascination. But then one wants to know more about the nature of this 
achievement. Just what is literary understanding like? What are its objects, and 
in what ways is, or isn’t, it a form of knowledge? (Parenthetically, it is worth 
noting that the issue about the effects of serious literary works on those who 
read them is not easy to settle empirically—the difficulty being that it is unclear 
how we might even begin to measure such effects. We would have to identify 
serious works, we would have to find a body of readers who had reflected on 
them seriously, perhaps within a practice of critical conversation, and we would 
have to find a control group of people equivalent to our readers in familial and 
social background—which are surely massively important for the formation and 
development of character—in order to isolate the effects of reading. It is not at 
all clear that we could find two such groups—serious readers and non-readers of 
otherwise equivalent backgrounds—and the terms “serious” and “reflected on” 
are not obviously open to parameterization in terms of variables that can be 
assigned a number via standard techniques of measurement. And yet many of us 
do retain a sense that serious reading—of course along with critical conversation 
and the massively significant effects of familial and social background—does 
make a difference to our characters.) To return to the problems of knowledge 
and truth: if, as Lamarque and Olsen admit, successful literary works “develop a 
theme in depth … through subject and form,”9 in such a way that understanding 
is advanced, why ought we then not to talk both of readers coming to know 
something and of the literary work’s ability to present truths, even if we will 
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then still face the task of illuminating in more detail exactly how these tricks are 
done?
Kendall Walton goes further than Lamarque and Olsen to describe the interest of 
literature as bound up with its power to present objects and incidents, while 
nonetheless himself also remaining broadly within the Fregean orbit. Against 
Frege, Walton denies that either fictional or more broadly literary language is 
either derivative from or less important than literal or scientific world- 
representing language. It is, he writes, “wrong to the core” to hold “that fiction 
 (p.125) is parasitic on ‘serious’ discourse, that fictional uses of language, 
pictures, or anything else are to be understood in terms of their use in making 
assertions, asking questions, issuing orders, or engaging in other activities 
characteristic of nonfictional language.”10 Literature and the other 
representational arts are their own forms of practice, and they are forms of 
serious business, involving the presentation of objects, persons, actions, and 
events for the sake, among other things, of cognitive advances. And yet there is 
a crucial, central difference, as in Frege, between what is presented in literal 
description and what is presented in (most or many) works of representational 
art. The objects, persons, events, and actions presented in a fictional literary 
work do not literally exist. Hence unlike “biographies, textbooks, newspaper 
articles,” and so on, which “are used to claim truth for certain propositions,” 
fictional literary representations “serve as props in games of make-believe.”11 
Representational works of art in general “are made specifically for the purpose 
of being used as props in games of certain kinds, indefinitely many of them 
played by different appreciators on different occasions.”12
The Fregean lineage of Walton’s position is clear. Literature just doesn’t engage 
with the real in the way that natural science does. Instead it traffics in another, 
artificial world—the work world, or the world that it sets up by prescribing to us 
to make believe that things are thus and so. At first blush, one can worry about 
this position that, as John Gibson puts it, offers “a picture of fiction as fodder for 
fantasy,”13 detached from life. Walton’s reply to this is that however detached 
from engagement with the real (in comparison with the natural sciences) 
fictional texts and other literary works may be, trafficking with them is 
nonetheless a serious business that engages with the real indirectly. We respond 
to literary texts not with real emotions—since we lack the readiness to act in 
relevant ways and the belief in the existence of real persons that are 
characteristic of genuine person-directed emotions—but with quasi-emotions, 
that is, emotional contours, as it were, or emotions stripped of the components 
of action-readiness and belief. Through quasi-emotional engagement with 
literary works, we are able to practice at what it is at least like to feel thus and 
so, in ways that are prescribed by the work, freely, from a position that is 
insulated from responsibilities and urgencies. This practice with quasi-emotions 
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enables readers, as Walton puts it, to arrive at “deepened awareness of 
themselves and their situations.”14
 (p.126) This is an attractive suggestion on Walton’s part. Yet it seems in the 
end only to restate the problem. What, exactly, is the nature of the “deepened 
awareness” of ourselves and our situations at which we may arrive? In 
particular, how is this centrally a matter of the invocation and shaping of 
emotions? Just how like real emotions are quasi-emotions? If they are very like 
real emotions directed at really existing persons, objects, and situations, then 
the puzzle seems to remain about how we are able to feel even quasi-emotions 
with respect to fictional objects. If they are less like real emotions—if the 
absence of readiness to act and of belief in the real existence of a relevant object 
make an important difference—then we are faced with the question of how 
practice in having and reflecting on quasi-emotions carries over into the having 
of appropriate genuine emotions in real life. Perhaps the circumstances of 
reading as opposed to those of life are just different enough that no real 
emotional training for life arises out of reading; sitting quietly with a book in 
hand seems on the face of it quite detached from being bound up emotionally in 
the direct pressure of life’s urgencies. Quasi-emotions as mere emotional 
contours, emptied of belief, may be pale and irrelevant to responding with 
feeling when one does believe certain things are really going on.
Worse yet for Walton’s view, sometimes—for example as in much lyric poetry—an 
actual object is in view as a focus for imaginative and emotional attention. Here 
we are, with Sylvia Plath, say, directly invited to imagine and attend emotionally 
to what it is like for her actually to have cut her thumb (and thought and felt 
about it) while slicing onions when pregnant. This makes it clear that, as Richard 
Moran argues,
emotional aspects of imagination … should … be seen as part of the 
manner of imagining and not as something that must belong to the content 
of what is imagined. … Imagining something with apprehension is the 
description of something the person is actually engaged in, and is not 
something within the scope of what is imagined.15
That is, paying attention imaginatively (and emotionally) to what is going on, 
whether fictional or factual, is a way of holding that subject matter in view and 
trying to get clearer about its significance. Here Moran shares with Walton the 
thought that experiences of a literary work involve exercises of imagination that 
include “‘trying on’ the point of view, trying to determine what it is like to 
inhabit it,”16 as a point of view is directed to its intended objects, which objects 
may now,  (p.127) Moran notes, be either actual or fictional. In emphasizing 
that imagining is an active doing of something that may be prompted by the real 
and may have a manner or style, Moran helps us to see how literary attention is 
structured by devices of emplotment and figuration. Literary attention does not 
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drive toward transparency in presenting a work-world for the sake of make- 
believe as accurately as possible. Instead, diction, figuration, and emplotment 
(making narrative connections among incidents, thoughts, and emotional 
engagements) highlight and structure how things, whether fictional or actual, 
may matter for us. Literary texts that use such devices “are expressive of a 
certain complex attitude”17 that may be directed indifferently at either fictional 
or really existing attentional objects and that may be subjected to development 
and clarification by the unfolding contours of plot and of literary surface as 
devices of attention. This point is already registered in Aristotle’s distinction 
between theoria and mimesis. Both theories and mimetic representations can be 
presented in words. Hence words as such are not the medium of mimetic literary 
representation, which is rather a matter of words used in a distinctive way to 
attend to the real, a way that involves imagining and that was developed from 
“improvisations … little by little” and that may involve “traditional stories” about 
what has in fact gone on in certain families.18 Thus, as Joseph Margolis elegantly 
puts it, contra Walton, “the imaginative is hardly limited to the imaginary,”19 and 
that it is a mode of presentation of the actual may sometimes be what is most 
important about it.
What Moran does not yet quite account for however, beyond the talk, following 
Walton, of practice and training, is any possible truth-content of the literary 
work. Though literary attention involving imaginative and emotional 
engagement may be directed at the real, the emphasis still lies on the training of 
imagination and emotional response rather than on the presentation of truths. 
Moran does end his essay with the thought that “we seem committed to the idea 
that imagination is a vehicle of knowledge of various kinds,” for example as in 
thought experiments, but he confesses that “we understand very little of how 
exercises of the imagination relate to learning anything about the world, or 
about our concepts, or about ourselves.”20
 (p.128) 3.
Perhaps then, rather than focusing on the line that emphasizes what readers are 
doing when they are engaging with literary works and how they are changing as 
a result, we should turn to sharply anti-Fregean views that directly emphasize 
the ability of works of art, literary and otherwise, to present truths. Prominent 
among these views is the work of Nelson Goodman. His 1976 Languages of Art 
was motivated primarily by an effort to avoid estheticist views of art and instead 
to see media of art as involving the use of symbol systems, distinct in their 
structural syntactic and semantic features from the ‘literal’ sentential symbol 
systems of the natural sciences, but equally apt for presenting truths. Where the 
natural sciences use sentences ‘directly’ representationally, artistic symbol 
systems use other symbols depictively, as in painting, where the symbol system 
is semantically and syntactically replete (every alteration of the smallest mark 
makes a difference), or expressively, as when words are used to recast schemata 
for the presentation of objects, as in metaphors. Yet in art as in science, 
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presentation of the truth is a predominant aim. As Goodman puts it, the 
experience of art “is cognitive experience distinguished by the dominance of 
certain symbolic characteristics and judged by standards of cognitive efficacy.”21
The trouble, however, with this view is that it threatens to undervalue, both in 
science and in art, the constraints on correctness of representation and on the 
presentation of truth that come from the world. Rightness of rendering, 
according to Goodman, “is primarily a matter of fit: fit to what is referred to in 
one way or another, or to other renderings, or to modes and manners of 
organization,” as may be. “The differences between fitting a version to a world, a 
world to a version, and a version together or to other versions fade when the 
role of versions in making the worlds they fit is recognized.”22 Goodman resists 
the charge that talk, indifferently, of fitting versions to one another or to the 
world amounts to a misunderstanding or undervaluing of objectivity and of the 
constraints on our practices that are set by the real.
When the verbiage view [that all there are are versions, no givens] 
threatens to dissolve everything into nothing, we insist that all true 
versions describe worlds. When the right-to-life sentiment [—let a 
thousand worlds bloom, together with all their objects—] threatens an 
overpopulation of worlds, we call it all talk.23
 (p.129) In practice, we sort things out on the ground roughly, without worrying 
much about metaphysical realism vs. metaphysical idealism.
Rough, ready, contextual, and in principle provisional though our sortings out of 
our cognitive commitments may be, however, it is not clear that Goodman’s 
somewhat cavalier pragmatism either will or should satisfy practitioners of 
either natural science or literary art. In both natural science and literary art, 
sources of correction seem to practitioners often to come from the world itself. 
Albeit that a lot of interpretive work based on wider assumptions and practices 
is required, the structure of a DNA molecule is a double helix, not a single helix, 
given the images on the X-ray diffraction films. And likewise the marriage of 
Elizabeth and Darcy, along with the marriages of their rough real-world 
counterparts, just is more compellingly and honorably an image and vehicle of 
potential human happiness than are the marriages of Charlotte Lucas and Mr. 
Collins, or Mr. and Mrs. Bennet, along with their real-world counterparts.
In a radically different idiom, Martin Heidegger insists that “art is then the 
becoming and happening of truth.”24 Arriving at this claim initially by way of a 
(contested) analysis of a Van Gogh painting of worn, dirt-covered “country” 
shoes, Heidegger construes this truth as a matter of “unconcealedness, … 
aletheia,” whereby “some particular entity, a pair of peasant shoes, comes in the 
work to stand in the light of its being. The being of the being comes into the 
steadiness of its shining.”25 While it is not initially clear what “standing in the 
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light of its being” and “coming into the steadiness of its shining” involve on the 
part of the shoes that are presented in and via the painting, it is clear that the 
work itself is not to be construed as either simply a mere thing on its own or as a 
copy of what it represents. Rather the work has a disclosive function; something 
essential about the very being of the shoes as artifact is made manifest. As 
Heidegger then goes on to develop his analysis of art’s disclosive powers via 
discussion of a Greek temple, it emerges that what is disclosed is how a (typical, 
central) artifact functions in the life of a historical people, so that what is 
disclosed is the-thing-in-central-relation-to-a-way-of-life, where Heidegger’s term 
for a broad way of life that is historically established and grounded on the earth 
is world.
The world is the self-disclosing openness of the broad paths of the simple 
and essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people. … Genuinely 
poetic projection [which  (p.130) takes place in and through all genuine 
art] is the opening up or disclosure of that into which human being as 
historical is already cast.26
One can object to the extreme selectivity of Heidegger’s examples, as though 
one or two paintings, a Greek temple, and six or eight poems by Hölderlin and 
Rilke could stand in for the whole of art. Within a governing focus on central 
cases, however, selectivity by itself is not an obvious failing. More significant are 
the problems with Heidegger’s treatments of his examples. It is by no means 
clear that he reads the Van Gogh painting correctly,27 let alone the poetry of 
Hölderlin.28 With regard to Hölderlin in particular, Heidegger puts in place of 
Hölderlin’s own situated, tentative, malleable expressive subjectivity a picture of 
Hölderlin as a mere vessel for the confident self-opening of Being toward the 
formation of a new historical world. At the theoretical level, this comes out in 
Heidegger’s own over-confident talk of “the destiny of an historical people,” as 
though the identity-conditions for historical peoples and their destinies were 
clear, in prospect as well as in retrospect. In addition, Heidegger’s talk of the 
disclosive powers of art, while situating art firmly on the side of cognition, pays 
comparatively little attention to the workings of specific, often multivalent, 
devices of poetic formation. Specific individual lines, words, and images are read 
on their own with relatively little feel for their dramatic contexts and for the 
tentativeness of the overall emplotment of a Hölderlin poem. If the members of 
the family of post-Fregean views tend to focus too much on the powers and 
effects of poetry within the psychologies of individual reading subjects and to be 
shy about the presentation of truth, the anti-Fregean views tend to focus too 
much on works and their alethic presentational powers, with too little attention 
given to how works are generated and received by complex, historically situated 
subjectivities that are the bearers of multi-dimensional thoughts and attitudes. 
Hence they risk distorting or failing to capture the needs and interests of these 
subjectivities that are served by works of literary art.
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In each case—the post-Fregean views of Lamarque and Olsen and Walton and 
the anti-Fregean views of Goodman and Heidegger—the development of the  (p. 
131) view is shaped significantly both by a contrast with the practices and 
achievements of the natural sciences and by concentration on the effects of 
literature on its audiences more than by direct attention to what writers of 
works of literary art are trying to do and doing. That is, while the topics of the 
effects and uses of literature, both psychological and social, and of the poetic 
mode of construction of a work and its presentation of a content, are surely 
intimately connected with one another,29 beginning with close attention to the 
latter topic may help us to avoid some of the oversimplifications that result from 
an initial concentration on uses and effects in comparison with those of science.
4.
Among philosophers who have treated at length the nature of poetic 
construction and its presentation of a content and who have done so in full 
awareness of the historical varieties of literary works, Hegel is pre-eminent. 
Hegel’s account of the ability of poetry to present a distinctive kind of truth 
centers around what he calls die poetische Auffassung [ihrer Gegenstände] in 
contrast with die prosaische Auffassung (LFA 2: 972; 15: 239). (“Poetry” is 
Hegel’s general term for all forms of literary art; indeed, what he calls the poetic 
“runs through” all forms of art [LFA 1: 89; 13: 123].) The word Auffassung is 
translated as “treatment” by Knox, suggesting rightly enough poetry’s way of 
handling its objects. But Auffassung also suggests more broadly conceiving of, 
paying attention to, perceiving, grasping, or taking in. Throughout his 
discussion, that is, Hegel describes die poetische Auffassung as a manner of 
world-intake or attention to the objects of a world: “attention [Aufmerksamkeit] 
is drawn [by the work] precisely to the appearing existent [das erscheinende 
Dasein]” (LFA 2: 1005; 15: 281; translation modified). But this manner of 
attention to an object is both distinct from either abstract thought or science, on 
the one hand, or the pure presentation of particulars via sensation, on the other, 
and it is bound up with the specifically poetic use of language.
Poetry displays the unification [of conception and execution] most 
strikingly, in that it is essentially to be interpreted as a withdrawal 
[Herausgehen] from the real world of sense perception as well as a 
subordination of that world, yet not however as a production that does not 
dare to engage in embodiment [Verleiblichung] and movement in the 
external  (p.132) world. … The poetic expression gives us more, because it 
adds to the understanding of the object a vision [Anschauung] of it, or 
rather it dispenses with [entfernt] the bare abstract understanding and 
puts the real determinacy of the object [die reale Bestimmtheit] in its 
place. … When [poetry] attains its aim, not only is it liberated from that 
separation between thinking which is concentrated on the universal, and 
feeling and vision [Anschauung], which seize on [auffassen] the individual, 
but it also at the same time frees these latter forms of consciousness 
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together with their content and objects out of their mere servitude and 
conducts them victoriously toward reconciliation with what is in itself 
universal (LFA 2: 967–8, 1002, 1006; 15: 234, 277, 282; translation 
modified).
While the terminology in this passage is perhaps now foreign to us, the line of 
thinking is clear. Poetry is different from both scientific classification and the 
sensible intuition of particulars in that it attends to objects in such a way that 
thinking, feeling, and intuition remain bound up with one another. Hence it is 
different from free fantasy or make-believe in its engagements with objects, it is 
different from idle feeling, and it is different from abstract generalization. 
Presenting instead the real determinacy of the object attended to, in such a way 
that reconciliation with what is universal is achieved, is a matter of locating the 
object within a framework of imaginative emplotment that reveals its 
significance in relation to developing human life. The object attended to may be 
as initially simple as a field of daffodils or as complex as the French Revolution 
and its effects on human character. What is important is that the object attended 
to is presented as “animated, manifest, ensouled” (LFA 2: 973; 15: 241), insofar 
as it is bound up via the work with a now more intelligible plot of human efforts 
to achieve freedom as being-with-oneself-in-an-other within the actual world, 
bound up, that is, with what Hegel calls the self-developing universal.
Accordingly, the chief task of poetry is to bring before our minds the 
powers governing spiritual life, and, in short, all that surges to and fro in 
human passion and feeling or passes quietly through our meditations—the 
all-encompassing realm of human ideas, deeds, actions, and fates, the 
bustle of life in this world, and the divine rule of the universe. Thus poetry 
has been and is still the most universal and widespread teacher of the 
human race. For to teach and to learn is to know and experience what is. … 
Man exists conformably to the law of his existence only when he knows 
what he is and what his surroundings are: he must know what the powers 
are which drive and direct him, and it is such a knowledge that poetry 
provides in its original and substantive form (LFA 2: 972–3; 15: 239–40).
To bring before our minds not just the individual physical or sensible object of 
attention (whether object, person, incident, or scene), and not just the object as 
an instance of an abstract universal, but rather the object as ensouled, in being 
bound up in a plot of the development of the powers that drive us, requires 
specific means of poetic responsiveness that are distinct from sensible intake, 
 (p.133) measurement, and straightforward classification. Analytically, we can 
distinguish in a literary work at least four levels of the work’s organization: (1) 
its acoustical or graphical surface, that is, the sheer sound or look of its words; 
(2) its plot, which may include not only sequences of public actions on the part of 
characterized figures, but also sequences of reflections, reactions, and feelings; 
(3) its theme, that is, what the elements of the plot that are presented have to do 
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with each other, in presenting, as Aristotle puts it, “things that are possible in 
accordance with probability or necessity”30 in human life; and (4) its persona, 
that is, the presented authorial intelligence that is both developing the 
presented incidents and is engaged with them. These levels are analytically, not 
experientially, distinct. Writers of literary art typically attend to all four levels of 
organization as they develop the work, and in reading we tend primarily to 
alternate between attention to plot and theme, with attention to surface and 
authorial personae implicit and always available as possibilities. Running 
throughout each of these levels of textual organization are diction and figuration 
—the presentation of objects and incidents through imaginative comparison and 
stylized mode of attention. The intent and the effect of a work of literary art is, 
precisely through comprehensive organization on each of these levels as well as 
the use of figuration and diction, to compel and guide sustained attention to the 
particulars that are presented. Hegel writes of how, when the incidents 
presented are “vitally interwoven” [“lebendig ineinander verwebt”], we are 
brought by the work to “tarry in” or “linger with pleasure over” [“verweilen”] 
what is presented, as its significance for thought, feeling, and “the powers 
governing spiritual life” is made manifest through the text’s densities of 
organized attention (LFA 2: 979, 981; 15: 248, 250–1). Hegel discusses in detail 
poetic versification, including rhyme and rhythm, poetic expression in contrast 
with prosaic expression, poetic subjectivity, and the forms of emplotment that 
are especially salient at distinct stages of human historical life—that is, epic, 
ancient, and modern dramatic poetry, and lyric, where lyric, though more 
distinctly important in modernity, is also available at any civilized and settled 
historical epoch.
5.
Yet, for all that Hegel’s account of poetic attention to the objects, persons, 
scenes, and incidents of a world offers a compelling account of the work of 
literary art in relation to human historical life in the world, it is also likely, at 
least in part, to strike us as overconfident. Is there really only one coherent set 
of “powers  (p.134) governing spiritual life,” one self-developing universal 
aiming fruitfully at freedom as comprehensive being-with-oneself-in-an-other? It 
is difficult for anyone nowadays to be a Hegelian just like that, taking there to be 
only one self-developing universal manifesting itself everywhere in intelligible 
ways, at least retrospectively. Do the genres of epic, ancient drama, modern 
drama, and lyric succeed one another as central poetic forms in just that way, 
with the task of bringing sheer particulars into reflective and emotional clarity 
allotted to lyric, once the serious task of orientation in modern life is given over 
to philosophy’s descriptions of governing institutions of successful modern social 
life? Does art, literary or otherwise, succeed in forming common audiences of 
wide circumference who respond alike to the powers of presentation of specific 
works, or are there, always, divergences of response and persistent interpretive 
and critical disputes?
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There are no simple, ready answers to these questions. Hegel admits explicitly 
that there is not now, in modernity, much consensus about art’s contents and 
achievements. In contrast with the more direct concern with spiritual powers 
that is typical of Symbolic (especially Egyptian) and Classical (especially Greek) 
art, in modern, post-Christian art
everything has a place, every sphere of life, all phenomena, the greatest 
and the least, the supreme and the trivial, the moral, immoral, and evil; 
and, in particular, the more art becomes secular, the more it makes itself at 
home in the finite things of the world, is satisfied with them, and grants 
them complete validity, and the artist does well when he portrays them as 
they are (LFA 1: 594; 14: 221).
Art has freed itself “from the content represented”; it has “got rid of [that] 
content which [hitherto] on every occasion was determinate for a particular 
people [and] a particular age” (LFA 1: 604; 14: 234).31 As a result, “we no longer 
bow our knee” (LFA 1: 103; 13: 142) before the presentations of art, but instead 
interpret, evaluate, discuss, and dispute about taste, all in relation to works in 
manifestly divergent media with manifestly divergent contents.
All this is more than likely, and with good reason, to raise questions about the 
objectivity of both critical judgment and artistic achievement in comparison with 
the objectivity in supporting rational consensus methodologically that is 
significantly more characteristic of the sciences. Absent objectivity comparable 
to that of the sciences, doubts are likely to persist, again with good reason, 
about the ability of art, literary and otherwise, to present a truth-content or to 
yield cognitive insight.
 (p.135) But it also true that modern life and the modern mathematical– 
scientific thinking that is prominent within it are themselves, as Hegel 
poignantly puts it, persistently “burdened with abstraction” (LFA 2: 1128; 15, 
437). It is easy, perhaps even commonplace, to grow up and then to live with a 
sense of going through the motions, as one submits to (or fails to live up to) the 
demands of education and of a job within a complex, technologically and socially 
differentiated system of labor. It is all too easy, and perhaps commonplace, to 
feel, at least at times, that things aren’t making sense and that one’s life is a 
matter only of happenstance and perhaps the pursuit of resources for private 
satisfactions. In these circumstances—with many of us at some times in the grip 
of a persistent need for and interest in orientation, reassurance, and animation 
in relation to our activities, institutions, and relationships—it may be more than 
reasonable to take seriously the literary artist’s “insight into the essence of 
human action” (LFA 2: 1179; 15: 502), as that insight may be achieved and 
sustained, however multivalently, through powers of literary form to present 
materials of human life for the clarification of thought and feeling.
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In a discussion of what he calls “romance, the modern popular epic” or of what 
we can recognize as the novel, Hegel notes that there remains in life “conflict 
between the poetry of the heart and the opposing prose of circumstances and 
the accidents of external situations” (LFA 2: 1092; 15: 393), as modern human 
beings face the problem of blending codifiable routine (the prose of 
circumstances) with sense and feeling (the poetry of the heart). In both art and 
life, such conflicts may be resolved, he goes on,
comically or tragically, or alternatively … when the characters originally 
opposed to the usual order of things learn to recognize in it what is 
substantive and really genuine, when they are reconciled with their 
circumstances and effective in them, or when the prosaic shape of what 
they do and achieve is stripped away, and therefore what they had before 
them as prose has its place taken by a reality akin and friendly to beauty 
and art (LFA 2: 1092–3; 15: 393).
Here the tragic and the comic involve, respectively, coming to terms with what 
one has errantly done as a result of persisting in a misdirected exercise of what 
is normally a virtue (as in Aristotelian reversal and recognition) or finding life 
good enough anyway, despite the reversals that it contains. But the two further 
cases are yet more interesting. We may sometimes learn to recognize what is 
substantive in how things are done and to become reconciled with it, as in a 
classic Bildungsroman plot, or we may achieve, at least in certain respects, a 
substantial enough re-enchantment of the world, as perhaps in a romance, 
where a couple recognizes and lives in mutual improvisation of their secret  (p. 
136) affinities, achieving together something like joint purposiveness without 
an exterior purpose.32
However multiple, pluralized, and closed to ready generalization they may be, 
these do seem to be possibilities of human life that take on specific shapes anew 
under changing circumstances and that can be made manifest by literary art, 
with its characteristic devices of attention to the real (emplotment, 
thematization, the modeling of attitude by an authorial persona, figuration, 
diction, and all the rest). In making these possibilities of life manifest in their 
specific shapes—showing, one might say, the universal in the particular—works 
of literary art hence have a power to present and reveal content that is latent in 
life. We can understand fictional and other literary works as tracking what tends 
to become of characters who come equipped with understandings of life, where 
these understandings of life are in circulation in general culture and not only 
within literary texts. As the literary scholar Ottmar Ette usefully puts it,
the dynamic modeling of literary characters [involves] a complex 
choreography of individuals who are variously equipped with 
understandings of life. Thus there appear in the cradle of the modern 
European novel in Don Quixote two characters, who from the beginning are 
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in possession of sharply opposed understandings that are then brought into 
contact with one another, experimentally “tested”, reflected, and modified, 
in ever new turnings and adventures within the fictional laboratory. While 
Sancho Panza appeals to the world of the Spanish proverb and thus to the 
form of knowledge of life of Iberian popular culture that has accumulated 
in proverbs, … the knowledge of life of Don Quixote stands for brilliance 
and danger, and for creativity and the collapse of a world created by means 
of fiction that has immediately and fatally penetrated into the direct 
practice of life.33
Or we might understand the recent novels of, say, Jonathan Franzen (Freedom, 
2010) and Jennifer Egan (A Visit from the Goon Squad, 2010) as each exploring a 
tendency, with all but infinite shades of variation, of certain largely middle-class 
characters within a highly media-saturated consumerist culture to live out 
infantilist conceptions of happiness as a matter of unrestrained choice directed 
toward achieving continuous momentary hedonic pleasure. What becomes of 
living within this tendency—a tendency that is present in our society and in 
many of us at some moments— what alternatives to living according to this 
tendency  (p.137) there might be, how these alternatives might be arrived at, 
and what in turn their consequences might be: all this is held in view for us, or 
at least undertaken to be held in view for us, by these novels.34
Given, however, the manifest pluralization of tendencies of life in the modern 
world, taking seriously such explorations of present but often unarticulated 
tendencies and possibilities of life as the truth-content of literary art will almost 
certainly leave us with a somewhat bifurcated concept of truth: methodologically 
achieved consensus about world-correspondent propositional contents for the 
natural sciences vs. understanding of salient human possibilities for and 
hindrances to reconciling the prose of life with the poetry of the heart for the 
literary arts. Or, to be more precise,35 it may leave us with a bifurcation in 
methods for arriving at truths and a division between two distinct domains of 
phenomena about which truths may be sought: mind-independent, neutrally 
measurable reality, and the social worlds of persons-in-relation-to-objects 
(including other persons). With respect to this latter domain, the task is not that 
of law-formulation or prediction or control or even neutral representation of the 
mind-independent, but rather, as Benjamin Rutter puts it, that of “expanding” or 
at least scrutinizing “the habitation of human life”36 via specifically artistic and 
literary devices of attention to it.
This bifurcation—in methods for aiming at truth, in domains open to truth- 
seeking, and in breadth of achieved consensus—may, in its way, cause unease. 
Debates about whether literary art embodies significant truth-content in a form 
of presentation that is in any way reliable are likely to persist. But it seems  (p. 
138) reasonable nonetheless to regard both natural science and literary art as 
forms of the presentation of a truth-content, and what else but debates about 
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reliability of presentation should one expect, for beings who are as complex and 
in possession of multiple interests and possibilities as we continue to find 
ourselves to be?
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